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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STEVE AMICONE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORA-
TION, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10736 
This action was commenced by Appellant, Steve Ami-
cone, who sought to establish that he was entitled to cer-
tain benefits under a retirement program created and main-
tained by Respondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation. The 
basis for the claim was his contention that he was totally 
and permanently disabled. The case was tried to a jury 
and submitted on instructions and special interrogatories. 
The answers to the interrogatories, as they were amplified 
iJy the instructions, were favorable to the Respondent and 
the District Court thereupon entered judgment in its favor. 
By this appeal, Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Appellant's statement of facts fails to include 
evidence which is necessary to a proper consideration of 
the issue, Respondent makes this supplemental statement. 
The provisions of the "Retirement Plan" administered 
by Respondent, which are relevant to the points involving 
disability are these : 
An employee who is permanently and totally 
disabled shall be retired from the service of the em-
ploying Company provided: 
(a) He has completed ten (10) or more years 
of continuous service to the date that his 
services ceased; and 
(b) His permanent and total disability has 
been established in the opinion of a quali-
fied physician, designated by the corpora-
tion. 
Permanent and total disability is defined as follows: 
" 'Permanent and Total Disability' for the pur-
poses of the Plan means disability by bodily injury 
or disease which prevents the Employee f rorn en-
gaging in any occupation or employment whatso-
ei1er for remuneration or profit, and which disa-
bility, in the opinion of a qualified physician ap-
pointed by the corporation, will be permanent and 
continuous during the remainder of the Employee's 
lifetime, * * *" (Ex. P-1, p. 38) (Emphasis 
ours.) 
The Plan is "non-contributory" in that salaried em-
ployees are not required to make any contributions and all 
monies used to pay benefits are furnished by Respondent. 
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In addition, the nature of the undertaking and the rights 
of the respective parties are founded in this language: 
"11.1 This Plan is strictly voluntary on the 
part of the Employing Companies and shall not be 
deemed to constitute a contract between any one 
or more of the Employing Companies and any Em-
ployee, nor to be a consideration for or an induce-
ment or condition of the employment of any Em-
ployee. Nothing in this Plan shall be deemed to 
give any Employee the right to be retained in the 
service of an Employing Company nor to interfere 
with the right of the Employing Company by which 
he shall then be employed to discharge any Em-
ployee at any time." 
"* * * 11.3 Except as provided in this 
Plan, no Employee, prior to his retirement under 
conditions of eligibility for pension benefits under 
this Plan, shall have any right or interest whatso-
ever in or to any portion of any funds which may 
be paid by an Employing Company into any Pen-
sion Trust or Trusts established for the purpose of 
paying pensions." (Ex. P.-1, p. 53) 
Appellant met the requirements of eligibility outlined 
under sub-paragraph (a) of the Plan as quoted above since 
he had been in the employ of Respondent for a period of 
at least ten years prior to his termination. 
By way of a preliminary approach to the problem, we 
set out generally Appellant's employment record. He was 
first employed by Respondent in 1936 and the relationship 
was terminated on January 19, 1965 (Ex. P-3). During 
this time, except for a four year period of military duty 
(Tr. 64), he was employed at various positions with the 
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company at its Bingham Canyon Mine, and, ultimately, its 
Research Center in Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 64 through 
70). In his earlier years with the company, Appellant was 
employed as a worker on the "track gang" (Tr. 63), but 
later he was transferred to the job of machinist helper, 
which involved oiling, cleaning and refueling heavy ma-
chinery and bulldozers (Tr. 64). He was then a "toe 
sampler" which required that he collect samples from the 
various drill holes on different mine levels, and transport 
them to the assay office for analysis (Tr. 65). In 1961, at 
his own request, he was transferred from the Utah Copper 
Division to the Kennecott Research Center located at the 
University of Utah. The Research Center is a department 
of the Western Mining Division and is disconnected from 
the Utah Copper Division in areas concerning personnel 
policies, hiring, and termination (Tr. 180). The job held 
by the Appellant at the Research Center involved shoveling 
of ore and moderately heavy lifting (Tr. 69-70). 
The evidence concerning Appellant's asserted total and 
permanent disability was substantially as follows: His 
present physical condition arises from his difficulty with 
a lumbar (low back) region. This originated in 1957 or 
1958 (Tr. 67 & 68) and has continued, more or less con-
stantly since that time (Tr. 68). In 1959 he was seen by 
Doctor Jenkins and Dr. Sorenson, who in consultation with 
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook diagnosed his ailments and pre-
scribed treatment. At that time, Dr. Holbrook suggested 
that a fusion be performed, but Appellant would not agree 
to such surgical procedure (Tr. 68). In June of 1963, he 
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was operated on by Dr. Peter Lindstrom, who performed a 
''laminectomy" and presumably removed one of Appellant's 
intervertebral discs (Tr. 70, 120). No fusion was per-
formed in this operation (Tr. 121-23). 
The Appellant was subsequently treated by Dr. Mark 
Gl'eene, an orthopedic surgeon, who treated him for a limi-
tation of motion in the shoulder. In addition, Dr. Greene 
made a diagnosis of the condition of Appellant's back (Tr. 
141). The Appellant assumed an inactive status with the 
company on June 18, 1964, to permit him to recuperate 
from the surgery which had been performed on his shoul-
der (Tr. 136). On November 9, 1964, he filed with the 
Company an application for retirement under the total and 
permanent disability provisions of the plan (Ex. 7-D). He 
was of the opinion, as certified in his application, that he 
would be "unable to perform any work or engage in any 
occupation or employment" for an indefinite period. 
At the time of this application, the Appellant was ex-
amined by two physicians, who reported their evaluation 
of his condition to the Respondent. The report of Dr. Mark 
H. Greene, who was the Appellant's attending physician, 
was submitted to Respondent on November 10, 1964 (Ex. 
6-D). Disregarding his views on the injury to Appellant's 
shoulder, he made the following prognosis and drew the 
following conclusions: 
"Back - prognosis poor. Patient, I believe is 
eventually going to have to have further surgery 
on the back to alleviate his difficulties." 
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"In my opinion, the disability of the Applicant 
is such that he may engage in the following occupa-
tions or employments - any employment which 
does not require heavy lifting or shoveling." 
"In my opinion, the Appellant is not totally dis-
abled * * *" 
The other report was submitted by Dr. E. B. Kuhe, 
on November 11, 1964. He stated that the Appellant never 
would be able to do hard manual labor, but could perform 
clerical work, light bench work, watchman or guard, and 
concluded that: 
"In my opinion, the applicant is not totally dis-
abled." 
On or about the 2nd day of January, 1965, Appellant 
sought to return to his employment and in connection there-
with, he had a conversation with his immediate supervisor 
at the Kennecott Research Center. He was informed at 
that time that there were no job vacancies at the Research 
Center which the Appellant would be physically able to 
perform (Tr. 180-181). This Center employs approxi-
mately 75 persons who for the most part are professionally 
trained individuals and the Appellant had informed the 
Center he needed lighter work than was available there. 
Four days after Appellant's services with Respondent 
were terminated, he joined a bowling league (Tr. 102). 
During the remainder of the season, he bowled 42 games 
with an average of 175 (Tr. 164). In October of 1965, the 
Appellant obtained a job with the neighborhood youth corps 
as a supervisor (Tr. 165-65). The salary for this job was 
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approximately $425.00 per month (Tr. 164). He was able 
to satisfactorily perform on that job for a period of two 
and one half months, at the stated salary (Tr. 165). He 
did not leave this job because of his incapacity to work, 
but because of a new injury which occurred when he fell 
nn a parking lot (Tr. 165) and for which he received pay-
ments under the Utah State Workmen's Compensation Act. 
During this time that the Appellant was so employed, he 
was not informed by his supervisor or employer that he 
was unqualified or physically unable to perform the job 
(Tr. 166) and they expressed interest in having him return 
to work (Tr. 166). Appellant himself conceded on cross-
examination that there were a number of jobs which are 
within his physical and mental capabilities (Tr. 96-99). 
In addition to the disability testimony previously 
quoted, the following evidence is in the record: 
Dr. Kuhe, stated that the Appellant should not do 
heavy lifting, shoveling, lifting weights greater than 20 
to 25 pounds or twisting such as a person wouU have to do 
when shoveling. He stated further that the Appellant 
rnuld perform all types of manual labor except for doing 
those jobs which required stooping, lifting, and twisting 
(Tr. 114). In his opinion, the Appellant could have worked 
in such occupations as a janitor, truck driver, or similar 
iobs (Tr. 114). 
Dr. Holbrook stated that as far as Appellant's em-
ployability was concerned, it would appear that he should 
fie able to carry out moderate types of activity which did 
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not involve excessive stooping, lifting, or twisting. Asked 
to enumerate some specific jobs which he felt the Appel-
lant could fill, Dr. Holbrook stated that he could be em-
ployed as a salesman, a messenger, guard, truck driver and 
that there were "thousands of jobs" that could be per-
formed within this type of physical limitations (Tr. 129). 
He defined total and permanent disability as follows: 
"This means that a man cannot reasonably be 
expected to be employable on a constant or average 
market." 
He joined with the other medical experts in the conclusion 
that Appellant was not totally and permanently disabled 
(Tr. 130). 
Dr. Greene, an orthopedist, was the Appellant's per-
sonal physician. He stated that in his opinion, the Appel-
lant was not totally and permanently disabled (Tr. 139) 
and it was his conclusion that Appellant could perform 
any type of occupation which did not require heavy lifting 
(Tr. 144). Dr. Greene admitted that there were numerous 
factors that went into the question of "total and permanent 
disability" including the educational background, age, train-
ing, and experience of the patient (Tr. 148). However, in 
forming his opinion that the Appellant was not totally and 
permanently :iisabled, he took such factors into considera-
tion (Tr. 150). Further evidence touching on Appellant's 
physical condition will be stated under the particular point 
involved. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO THE SPECIAL IN-
TERROGATORIES COMPELLED THE TRIAL 
COURT TO ENTER A JUDGMENT FOR RE-
SPONDENT. 
We have rephrased Appellant's Point I for he fails 
on this appeal, as he did in the Court below, to recognize 
a valid and critical distinction between the principles con-
trolling this case and those governing contractual benefits 
and obligations. His theory and approach is based upon 
the premise that the Respondent's Retirement Plan is sub-
ject to the same rules of construction and operation as are 
health and accident insurance policies. Thus, Appellant 
places greight weight on some of the language found in 
Colovas v. Home Life Insurance Company of New York, 
28 P.2d 607, 83 Utah 401 (1934), and argues that it is 
dispositive of the issues herein involved. 
Respondent approaches the point on an entirely differ-
ent basis and urges that the alleged parallel between the 
"Plan" and the average health and accident insurance pol-
icy is based on a false premise; that there exists a most 
basic and fundamental difference between the "Plan" and 
the average insurance contract; that these distinctions re-
quire different legal consideration and rules of construc-
tion; and finally assuming without deciding that contract-
ual principles govern, the appellant, nonetheless, is barred 
from recovery. 
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For the most part, contracts of insurance are prepare] 
by the Insurance Company for the purpose of making a 
profit and are bought and paid for by the insured. More-
over, insurance policies have from time to time been the 
subject of questionable sales techniques and their wording, 
sometimes referred to as the "fine print", frequently re-
sults in misleading an insured into believing that he has 
acquired rights which are not included in the coverage of 
the policy when carefully read. Because of such abuses, 
the courts have construed the terms of that class of con-
tracts strictly against the insurer in order to secure to the 
insured the benefits which he was led to believe he was 
entitld to and for which he paid his premiums. Thus, in 
contract cases with ambiguous language we find numerous 
rules of construction which give to the insured his full 
measure of judicial protection. 
For good reasons, the courts have taken a different 
approach to pension or retirement programs such as the 
one here in question. The entire burden of administering 
and financing the plan is assumed by the Company and the 
benefits are gifts to the employees. They do not contribute 
funds and there is no trust established for their benefit. 
Such a plan is a largesse and not a contract - as, indeed, 
the plan itself specifically provUes (Ex. P-1, p. 53). There 
is no requirement in law or equity which requires the Com-
pany to institute or maintain such a program and certainly, 
all employees are happy with benefits offered to them at 
no expense. Because of the benefactions bestowed by these 
non-contributing programs, the courts have not saddled 
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tlte c1·eator with obligations which are not specifically and 
clearly provided for, and particularly must a beneficiary 
show he has met the qualifications to bring him within 
tlw fold. 
In Boyd \'. Operating Engineers, 193 Pa. Super. 438, 
1 G5 A.2d 289, 292 ( 1960); the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania stated: 
"Here, however, we are dealing with the in-
ternal management of a union welfare fund and, in 
view of the unique resolutions passed by it, the gcn-
e1·al rules of insurance have no applicatfon.'' (Em-
phasis ours.) 
In Nueffer v. Bo.kery & Confectionary Worke1·s, 193 
F.Supp. 699, 700 (D. C. 1961); aff'd, 307 F.2d 671 (D. C. 
Cir. 1962), citing another case, the court notes: 
"It is there without doubt held that in any such 
gratuitous pension plan there are none of the essen-
tial elements of a contract and the courts w'ill not 
construe such a voluntary non-contributory plan 
strictly against an empfoyr,r." (Emphasis ours.) 
Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 1944) is 
to the same effect: 
"The contract here possessed none of the ele-
ments of a contract of insurance and is not to be 
interpreted strictly against the railroad company, 
especially since the burden it assumed was entirely 
voluntary and gratuitous." 
On the basis of such decisions, it is readily apparent that 
the general rules of construction normally employed with 
12 
regard to insurance contracts are inapplicable. Thus, it 
would follow that Appellant's reliance upon cases such as 
Colovas which create a contractual relationship is mis-
placed. 
In light of the foregoing principles of interpretation 
and construction, the issue on this appeal narrows to the 
question of whether Appellant brought himself within the 
class covered by the plan. As noted previously, one basic 
condition precedent to qualification is that the employee 
must show: 
"His permanent and total disability has been 
established in the opinion of a qualified physician 
designated by the Company" (Ex. P-1, p. 38). 
The evidence is undisputed and plethoric to support Re-
spondent's contention that Appellant failed to satisfy such 
condition. Three doctors - Kuhe, Greene and Holbrook 
- each expressed their opinion that Appellant was not 
totally and permanently disabled. Significantly, Appellant 
failed to produce any testimony to contradict such opin-
ions. 
Appellant's failure to meet this condition was the key-
stone of Respondent's defense at trial. Moreover, assum-
ing for the purpose of this discussion that the giving of 
instructions was proper, the trial judge instructed the jury 
as follows with respect to this condition: 
"INSTRUCTION NO. 13 
You are instructed that the plaintiff must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his 
permanent and total disability has been established 
13 
in the opinion of a qualified physician designated 
by the defendant and that in the opinion of a quali-
fied physician appointed by the defendant the disa-
bility will be permanent and continuous during the 
remainder of plaintiff's life" (R. 27). (Emphasis 
ours.) 
In light of the posture of the evidence and to give 
effect to this instruction, the jury had to find that no doc-
tor selected by Respondent had formed or expressed an 
opinion that Appellant's disability was total. Since Appel-
lant had failed to prove that he satisfied that basic re-
quirement for eligibility under the plan, the Court entered 
judgment for Respondent - no cause of action (Tr. 48). 
Parenthetically, it is appropriate to note that Appellant 
took no exceptions to either Instruction 13 or special In-
terrogatory No. 2 even though they clearly embodied the 
theory advocated by Respondent throughout this entire 
litigation. 
ln further developing the law on gratuitous pension 
plans, we mention that the necessity of having to comply 
with conditions precedent before a right or privilege arises 
is fundamental and elementary to contract law. Before 
one may recover under the terms of a contract, he must 
satisfy any conditions precedent specified therein. Other-
wise, he does not bring himself within the reach of its pro-
Yi8ions and has no right to complain of a breach. Certainly 
this basic principle shouU be applicable to a non-contribu-
tory, voluntary pension program. That precise question 
has been considered by trial and appellate courts and there 
is unanimity in their holding that an employer may pre-
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scribe such conditions precedent as it sees fit m such a 
plan and the employee must qualify, if at all, under the 
prescribed conditions. 
One of the leading cases in this field is Menke v. 
Thonipson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944), involving a rail-
road company's pension plan, which, as in the instant case, 
was voluntary and non-contributory. Concerning the em-
ployer's right to impose conditions precelent to eligibility. 
the Court observed: 
"The pension plan of appellee railroad company 
was entirely voluntary, and its benefits were, as 
declared in the plan, gratuities. No fund was es-
tablished by the company and impressed with a 
trust for the benefit of its employees. The right of 
any employee to receive the pension provided was 
not made dependent upon contributions by the em-
ployee to the expense of paying the pension or to 
the expense of administering the pension plan. The 
whole burden was borne by the company. No stat-
ute then in force required of the company the as-
sumption of the burden which it took upon itself 
in providing for pensions for its employees. It 
therrfor'3 had the right, as the District Court cor-
rectly held, to condition its bounty in such manner 
as it saw fit" ( 140 F.2d at 790). (Emphasis ours.) 
To the same effect is the holding in Going v. Southern 
Mill Employee's Trust, 281 P.2d 762, 763 (Okla. 1955), 
wherein the Court stated: 
"While this court has never before hai occa-
sion to consider a profit sharing trust or any simi-
lar plan or arrangement, or to determine the rights 
of any of the parties involved in such a plan, many 
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of the other appellate courts in this country have 
considered such plans and arrangements. From a 
review of the opinions of those courts we conclude 
that an employer who creates a profit sharing re-
tire~nent plan for the benefit of his employees, 
which plan is a voluntary one supported solely by 
contributions from the employer, has the right to 
prescribe the terms of the plan and the manner in 
1vhich it shall be administered; and such terms as 
a1'e prescribed are binding upon and determinative 
of the rights of an employee o.sserting a right to 
benefits thereunder." (Emphasis ours.) 
In the case of In re Missou1·i Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, 49 F.Supp. 405, 406 (E.D. Mo. 1943), the court made 
the following observation: 
"The pension plan was a unilateral, voluntary 
undertaking of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Com-
pany, and it was competent for the company to 
make its bounty subject to whatever conditions it 
chose anJ to reserve to itself the power to determine 
whether such conditions had been met in any spe-
cific case." 
Even if we went one step further and assumed argu-
Pndo, that the Plan is contractual in nature, the result 
would be the same. Considered in that light, it is only an 
offer to form a unilateral contract wherein the Company 
says, in effect: "If you fulfill the conditions, you receive 
benefits." Under the law of contracts a contract is not 
binding until conditions precedent have been fulfilled. This 
Court has said as much in Driggs v. Utah Teachers Ret. 
Br'd, 105 Utah 417, 435, 142 P.2d 657, 665 (1943). In that 
instance, Justice Wolfe concurring in the result statej: 
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"When the employer promises to his employee 
prospective periodic payments to commence after 
a certain term of service and upon fulfillment of 
the conditions, it constitutes an off er 1vhich ripens 
into a contract upon the fulfillment of those condi-
tions * '' * " (Emphasis ours.) 
Since Appellant cannot recover on a theory of breach of 
contract, his cause must fail. It is not necessary, therefore, 
to indulge in extended arguments about whethe1· the Plan 
constitutes a conditional gift or a contract for in neither 
event has Appellant any right of recovery. 
Appellant seeks to strengthen his position by citing 
authorities to the effect that a claimant is not bound by his 
doctors' statements as the percentage of disability is a 
question which should be submitted to the jury. His argu-
ment in support of this proposition finds its roots in the 
insurance authorities such as Colovas, and Couch. As 
previously noted, however, this is simply not an insurance 
case and the rules of construction and interpretation cited 
in those authorities are inapposite. In that connection, Re-
spondent submits to the Court that the authorities which 
should be considered in disposing of this question are those 
dealing with plans similar to the one involved. Such cases 
clearly hold that where authority is given to a board or 
person to determine eligibility under a plan, the decision 
of such board or person is conclusive in the absence of 
fraud or bad faith. Respondent's plan provides that a doc-
tor must determine whether total disability exists. He is 
the appointed arbitrator whose decision is final and to 
succeed in proving his case, Appellant had the burden of 
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furnishing the Court with evidence that the arbitrator had 
found in his favor. The plan itself could not be more spe-
cific in this regard for, it states: 
"An employee is eligible 'provijed * * * 
his permanent and total disability has been estab-
lished in the opinion of a qualified physician desig-
nated by the Company'" (Ex. P-1, p. 38). (Em-
phasis ours.) 
Under similar provisions, the cases are unanimous to the 
effect that such a provision is valid and binding and failure 
to meet the condition is fatal to recovery. 
In the leading case of Menke v. Thompson, supra, at 
p. 791, the Court discussed the problem : 
"Appellant contends, however, that the pension 
plan constitutej an offer by the company to its em-
ployees, which, when accepted and its conditions 
met, resulted in a contract binding upon the com-
pany to pay the pension provided. Even so, Menke 
must be held to have accepted the offer subject to 
its express conditions. In order to be entitled to 
the pension pro'uided in the plan, Menke must not 
unZy have cumplied with each of these conditions, 
but also the Board of Pensions must have so found. 
The important question before the board was 
whether Menke had established his continuous ser-
vice in the employment of the company for 25 years, 
and on this question the appellant is bound by the 
decision of the board if fairly made. The authori-
ties are uniform in holding in cases of this charac-
ter that the decision of the administrative board, 
where the pension plan so provides, is conclusive 
upon the rights of an employee in the absence of 
fraud or arbitrary action. See cases cited supra. 
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The stipulations in pension plans for the decision 
of questions arising on the rights of employees to 
receive pensions are not unlike those often founJ 
in construction contracts, making an engiHeer or 
architect the final arbiter of disputes arising be-
tween the parties. Such stipulations are universally 
upheld. Road Improvement Dist. No. 5 of Critten-
den County, Ark., v. Roach, et al., 8 Cir., 18 F.2d 
755, 759; Clark v. New England Telephone & Tele-
graph Company, supra; McCullough v. Clinch-
Mitchell Construction Co., 8 Cir., 71 F.2d 17, 20, 
21;McGregor v. J. A. Ware Construction Co., 188 
Mo. 611, 87 S. W. 981, 984. The decision of the 
Board of Pensions denying Mcnke's claim /'or a 
pension is there! ore conclusive, to t:se the words of 
this court in Guild v. Andrews, 8 Cfr., 137 F. :369, 
371, 'in the absence of fraud or such gross mistakes 
as imply bad faith or a failure to exercise an honest 
juJgment'." (Emphasis ours.) 
Also to the same effect is Going v. Southern Mill Em-
ployee's Trust, supra, at 763-64: 
"* * * And where the terms of the plan 
as prescribed by such employer provide that the de- ; 
cision of the trustees appointed to administer such 
plan shall be final and conclusive, the decision of 
such trustees is binding on an employee claiming 
benefits under such plan. In this connection, see 
McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 322 App. iDv. 610, 
53 N.Y.S. 98; Dowling v. Texas & N. 0. R. Co., , 
Tex. Civ. App., 80 S. W. 2d 456; Spiner v. Western 
Union Telegraph Co., Tex. Civ. App., 73 S. W. 2d 
566; Clark v. New England Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., 229 Mass. 1, 118 N. E. 348; Western Union 
Telegraph Co. v. Robertson, 146 Ark. 406, 225 S. W. 
649; Menke v. Thompson, 8 Cir., 140 F.2d 786; 56 
C. J. S., Master and Servant, §§ 167-169. 
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"We conclude that the provisions of the trust 
agreement in question are binjing on, and deter-
minative of the rights of, plaintiff who is asserting 
the right to benefits thereunder, and that plaintiff 
has not shown any right of recovery on his part 
under such provision. The trial court therefore did 
not err in sustaining the demurred to plaintiff's 
evidence. 
"Judgment affirmed." 
In Webster v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 153 S. W. 2d 499 
(Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1941), the conclusion was the same: 
"[A] fund and plan established as was done 
by the defendant in the case, constitutes a charitable 
enterprise; that the .jefendant had the right to re-
serve to itself the manner in which the plan should 
be administered; that the action of the committee 
is final and conclusive and binding upon all its 
employees and not subject to attack in the courts, 
in the absence of an allegation and proof of fraud 
or bad faith." 
A Utah case supporting Respondent's position is Scho-
field v. Z. C. M. I., 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342 (1934). This 
Court held that after an employee had "completely per-
formed" the conditions of the Plan, it ripenej into a con-
tract. The Court discussed with approval several cases 
which had denied recovery where the employee had not met 
the prescribed conditions of the plan involved and quoted 
the following language which has particular applicability 
here: 
"Whatever rights were acquired by the pen-
sioners in this case were acquirej under the rules." 
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Moreover, Schofield also deals with the right of the Com-
pany to delegate the power to determine eligibility to a 
board. In that case, the board found that the employee was 
eligible and the Court held his rights thus became fixed. 
Respondent herein merely seeks to apply the converse of 
this doctrine - where the arbiter, here a doctor, has found 
ineligibility, the employee is bound by such findings. 
The cases are reviewed and summarized in Armota-
tion, 42 ALR2d 461, 472-73 (1955) as follows: 
"Private voluntary pension plans commonly 
contain a provision whereby the company manage-
ment, or boards set up for the administration of the 
plan, have discretion to determine eligibility and 
other matters under the plan, and it is usually pro-
vided that the decision in this respect shall be con 
-elusive. The courts have usually held that such 
grants of discretionary authority are effective and 
binding upon persons claiming benefits so that the 
decisions of the designated authority is not review-
able, at least in the absence of fraud." 
Thus, in the instant case, Respondent had the right to 
clothe a qualified doctor with power to determine total dis-
ability, and absent fraud or deceit, his determination was 
conclusive on the parties. Certainly, if the doctor involved 
had found that the disability was total, the Company woulJ 
have been precluded from coming into court and question-
ing such opinion. We submit that mutuality is the touch· 
stone in this situation and therefore Appellant is also bound 
by the determination. 
There has been no claim of bad faith, fraud or arbi· 
trariness on the part of the doctors which might take this 
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case out from under the general rules. To the contrary, 
Appellant has had the benefit of three different doctors -
erlch having testified that Appellant was not totally dis-
abled. There is not the slightest suggestion of bias and 
prejudice and it is of some moment to note that Dr. Kuhe 
acted on Appellant's behalf for he appealed to the Respon-
dr.nt to re-employ Appellant because of his long record 
with the company (Ex. 4-D). Certainly this testimony 
corroborates the doctor's conclusion that Appellant was 
able to work. In light of such evidence, the good faith and 
soundness of the doctors' opinions cannot be seriously 
questioned. 
In concluding the argument on this point, Responjent 
respectfully submits that since Appellant failed to satisfy 
a fundamental condition precedent to qualify for the Plan, 
he is precluded from recovery herein. 
It might be noted in passing that even if we were to 
assume, arguendo, and notwithstanding the formidable 
authoritr to the contrary, that Appellant's reasoning has 
applicability herein, nonetheless, total and permanent dis-
ability have not been shown. The Utah cases are clear that 
disability from performing one's original employment is 
not "total". See, Ralston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90 
Utah 391, 62 P.2d 1119 (1936). Moreover, it has been held 
that the assumption of a full time occupation (for example, 
Appellant's tour of duty with the Youth Corps) precludes 
a finding of total and permanent disability as of an earlier 
date. See Couch on Insurance, 2d § 53 : 130 ( 1966) . As 
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noted, however, such authorities are necessarily inapposite 
because this is not an insurance case. 
POINT II 
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO THE SPECIAL 
INTERROGATORIES ARE NOT INCONSIST-
ENT BUT ASSUMING TO THE CONTRARY, 
APPELLANT INDUCED THE AMBIGUITY 
AND TOOK NO EXCEPTION THERETO. 
In Point II of his brief, Appellant argues that the 
jury's answers to the special interrogatories are "diametric-
ally opposed" and thus a new trial should be granted. 
In inte.ipreting special interrogatories, the words of 
this Court in Pace v. Parish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 
(1952) are pertinent: 
"Whenever there is uncertainty or doubt in con-
nection with the correlation of interrogatories with 
each other and their answers, they should be so in· 
terpreted as to harmonize with the findings of the 
jury if that can reasonably be done." 
Appellant's specific concern is with Interrogatories No. 2 
and 3, and the jury's answers thereto. In answering In· 
terrogatory No. 2, the jury found that total disability had 
not been established in the opinion of a qualified physician 
appointed by the defendant. As previously noted, the facts 
are not in dispute with regard to this, and certainly there 
is no ambiguity concerning the jury's findings. However, 
the Appellant argues that this is inconsistent with the an· 
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swer to Interrogatory No. 3 in which the jury found that 
"such total disability would be continuous throughout the 
plaintiff's lifetime". 
Apparently the Appellant seeks to convince this Court 
that the answer to Interrogatory No. 3 controverts or modi-
fies the answer to Interrogatory No. 2 upon which the 
judgment of the Court is based. However, this problem is 
not as critical as suggested by Appellant. It can be solved 
by construing the word "such" in Interrogatory No. 3 with 
the language in Instruction No. 1 which states: "Based 
upon the definition of permanent and total disability given 
you in these instructions" did plaintiff Steve Amicone be-
come totally and permanently disabled. In Instruction No. 
12, the Court informed the jury that permanent and total 
disability has a specialized meaning in the law and this led 
the jury to believe the conclusion of the doctors on total 
disability were unimportant. 
It is the duty of the Court, if possible, to construe the 
Interrogatories to be consistent and to Jo this the word 
"such" in Interrogatory No. 3 must be interpreted in the 
light of the answer given to the first interrogatory. When 
considered together, the answers returned by the jury must 
mean that the disability, whether total within the specialized 
meaning defined by the Court, or partial, as testified to by 
the doctors, was fixed. 
Such a construction is consistent with the facts in the 
ren>nl since all of the doctors testified that the disability 
Which Appellant complains about was not total. He had a 
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back injury, but obviously it would follow from the testi-
mony that in the doctors' opinion, the disability was par-
tial. True it is that the medical experts concluded the in-
jury to the back was permanent. Certainly under the in-
structions, the jury was free to make its own determina-
tion of the percentage of disability even though the find-
ings were contrary to the opinions of the medical experts. 
But that has no bearing in the failure of Appellant to com-
ply with the plan. They involve different questions and the 
jury's conclusion that the disability was total and perma-
nent means only that the fact-finders disagree with the 
doctors. But disagreement between the jury and the doctor 
does not equal inconsistency. All three answers can be per-
mitted to stand and the judgment will be supported by 
them. 
Aside from the foregoing, the records bear clear and 
convincing proof that if there was inconsistency in the in· 
terrogatories, it was caused by Appellant's insistence on 
having an erroneous theory submitted to the jury. The 
only question involved in the case was whether the Appel-
lant qualified for the plan and his counsel argued that the 
jury should make that determination as he contended the 
conclusions of the doctors were immaterial. Appellant suc-
ceeded in convincing the Court that regardless of Appel-
lant's failure to meet the conditions, he was entitled to have 
the jury determine his physical condition and his request 
for instructions carried out that concept. Significantly, 
counsel for Appellant must have been happy with the re-
sults he obtained for he failed to take any exceptions to 
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the instruction or the interrogatories. The record shows 
affirmatively that he was satisfied with the charge given 
to the jury and under the after cited authorities, this pre-
cludes the raising of the question of inaccuracy or incon-
sistency on appeal (Tr. 132). 
As this Court noted in Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 101, 
308 P.2d 204 (1957): 
"But defendant neither objected nor excepted 
to the form of the questions and counsel cannot sit 
by and permit the court to submit the propositions 
and object if the verdict is unfavorable." 
Again, in the later case of Hanson v. General Builders 
Supply Company, 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 (1964) 
wherein the Appellant hau made a statement substantially 
identical to that of Appellant's counsel herein, the Court 
said: 
"Under such circumstances the rules will not 
justify or condone an expression by defendant of 
satisfaction, - without a word of objection, with 
che trial court's ruling as a matter of law as to the 
question of liability, only to change its position 
when it loses, otherwise it would have the enyiable 
effect of permitting a litigant to blow hot and cold, 
depending on the outcome of the verdict, and giving 
him two trials instead of one. Had counsel said 
nothing, the Coray case might be pertinent. Had 
counsel excepted to the instruction, he would have 
perfected his record. But having affirmatively ex-
pressed complete satisfaction with the court's ac-
tion, defendants, in all fairness, are deemed to have 
waived any automatic statutory exception." 
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The same rules certainly apply with respect to special in-
terrogatories. Since the Appellant did not object or express 
dissatisfaction concerning the interrogatories, he is pre-
cluded from complaining of their effect. Baker v. Cook, 6 
Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 2G4 (1957). 
Equally clear is the fact that Appellant's failure to 
except to Instruction No. rn. which embodied and mticu-
lated Respondent's theory of this litigation, precludes any 
question on appeal as to the propriety of the Court's judg-
ment based upon such Instruction. 
The trial court below was entitled to have the benefit of 
Appellant's objections and exceptions at the time of trial. 
Since Appellant failed to take timely exceptions, the in· 
structions submitted became the law of the case, and under 
such instructions, the judgment in favor of Respondent 
was clearly justified. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN SUBMITTING 
THE INTERROGATORIES AND INSTRUC-
TIONS TO THE .JURY AS THERE WAS NO 
EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THEIR SUBMIS-
SION. 
In presenting this point, counsel for Respondent, must 
of necessity repeat their assertion that the record affirma· 
tively shows that all doctors who examined or treated the 
Appellant testified that he was not totally disabled, and 
there was no contradicting testimony. For that reason, the 
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jury was compelled to answer Interrogatory No. 2 in the 
negative. But the submission of the case to the jury was 
error for the Trial Judge should have ruled as a matter of 
law that Appellant was not entitled to recover. Boskovich 
v. Utah Const. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953) 
As a predicate for his cause of action, Appellant al-
leged that he had fully compliej with all conditions and 
provisions of the plan. Obviously, compliance with the con-
ditions precedent was an essential element to plead and 
prove. 
At the conclusion of the testimony, Respondent made 
a motion for directed verdict assigning, inter alia, the 
following grounds: 
"That the plaintiff has failed to prove by any 
relevant and competent evidence that he is qualified 
for retirement under the Jefendant's Retirement 
Plan." 
"That the plaintiff has failed to prove by any 
relevant, competent evidence through a qualified 
physician, appointed by Defendant who has formed 
an opinion that plaintiff was permanently and to-
tally disabled on or before the alleged date of J anu-
ary 19, '65, or any time thereafter." 
"That the testimony affirmatively shows that 
all doctors who have examined the defendant have 
expressed an opinion and furnished that opinion to 
Kennecott Copper Corporation that the plaintiff is 
not totally and permanently disabled." 
This motion was denied erroneously and the question 
was submitted to the jury but there was only one answer 
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and this should have been known by the Trial Judge. The 
error, of course, was in Appellant's favor and is thus not 
a ground for his appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, Respondent respectfully submits that the 
judgment in its favor should be affirmed. The basic theory 
adopted by the trial court in entering judgment upon the 
answers to interrogatories is supported by the applicable 
law. Under a private, voluntary and non-contributory pro-
gram, the Company may exact such conditions precedent 
as it seems fit. The Appellant here failed to meet such con-
ditions in that no qualified physician found him to be to-
tally disabled - indeed, all testified that he could perform 
numerous jobs. He, himself, proved his lack of disability 
by satisfactorily performing a new job for a substantial 
period - halted only by a new injury. 
Appellant's protestations concerning the interrogator· 
ies should be tempered by the fact that such errors, if any, 
were self-induced and certainly not raised at an appropri-
ate juncture. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS, BERLE, EVANS 
& LATIMER, 
By GEORGE W. LATIMER, 
and 
GORDON L. ROBERTS, 
520 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
